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When Is Religious Speech Outrageous?: 
Snyder v. Phelps and the Limits of Religious 
Advocacy 
Jeffrey Shulman* 
The Constitution affords great protection to religiously motivated 
speech.  Religious liberty would mean little if it did not mean the right to 
profess and practice as well as to believe.  But are there limits beyond 
which religious speech loses its constitutional shield?  Would it violate 
the First Amendment to subject a religious entity to tort liability if its re-
ligious profession causes emotional distress?  When is religious speech 
outrageous? 
These are vexing questions, to say the least; but the United States 
Supreme Court will take them up next term—and it will do so in a fac-
tual context that has generated as much heat as light.  On March 8, 2010, 
the Court granted certiorari in Snyder v. Phelps.
1
  It is a tort case brought 
by a family grieving the untimely death of their son.  It is a free speech 
case, testing the boundaries of the constitutional commitment to the mar-
ketplace of ideas.  It is a religious liberty case that has made unlikely 
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Madison.  Professor Shulman has written on Snyder v. Phelps for the Penn State Law Re-
view.  See Jeffrey Shulman, The Outrageous God: Emotional Distress, Tort Liability, and 
the Limits of Religious Advocacy, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 381 (2008).  He also wrote an 
amicus brief on behalf of Albert Snyder.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Jeffrey I. Shulman 
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 1. Snyder v. Phelps, 2010 WL 757695 (U.S. March 08, 2010). 
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allies of those on opposite sides of the political and cultural divides that 
make our liberal democracy such a challenging enterprise. 
The most common of legal commonplaces is that the First Amend-
ment protects speech that some people—perhaps, most people—will find 
offensive.  Indeed, the protection of offensive speech is one of the great 
hallmarks of our constitutional order, the stamp that establishes the ge-
nuineness and the generosity of our freedoms, including a longstanding 
tradition of religious liberty.  It is no surprise that our courts, by training 
and instinct, want to protect the right to speak—and nowhere more so 
than where speech is religiously motivated.  It may be this very protec-
tiveness that led the Fourth Circuit to make such a mess of things. 
The basic facts of the case are clear enough.  Marine Lance Corpor-
al Matthew A. Snyder was killed in Iraq in the line of duty.  His funeral, 
held in Westminster, Maryland, was picketed by the Westboro Baptist 
Church.  The church held signs that read, “You are going to hell,” “God 
hates you,” “Thank God for dead soldiers,” and “Semper fi fags.”  Fol-
lowing the funeral, the church posted on its website (godhatesfags.com) 
an “epic” entitled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder.”  
Matthew‟s burden, as the church saw it, was that he had been “raised for 
the devil” and “taught to defy God.”  Matthew‟s father, Albert Snyder, 
brought a civil action against the Westboro Baptist Church in federal dis-
trict court, asserting a claim for intentional infliction of mental and emo-
tional distress (among other causes of action).
2
  He was awarded $10.9 
million in compensatory and punitive damages. 
That judgment was reversed by the Fourth Circuit.
3
  The court could 
have avoided the constitutional question by holding that Mr. Snyder 
failed to prove at trial sufficient evidence to support his tort claims.
4
  But 
the court waded into murky doctrinal waters—and made them a whole 
lot murkier. 
The court reasoned that the church‟s speech was constitutionally 
protected unless a reasonable person would understand it to be commu-
nicating objectively verifiable facts.  There are, the court went on to say, 
two categories of speech that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating 
actual facts about an individual.  The first is statements of public concern 
 
 2. Snyder originally brought suit on five counts: defamation, intrusion upon seclu-
sion, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil 
conspiracy.  Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d  567 (D. Md. 2008).  The district court 
granted defendants‟ motions for summary judgment on the claims for defamation and 
publicity given to private life.  Id. at 572-73.  The court held, however, that the remaining 
claims raised genuine issues of material fact.  Id. at 573. 
 3. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 4. See id. at 227-33 (Shedd, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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that fail to contain a provably false factual connotation.  The second is 
rhetorical statements employing loose, figurative, or hyperbolic lan-
guage.  These statements are categorically protected, regardless of the 
plaintiff‟s status as a public or private figure. 
Had the court gone no further, it would have generated confusion 
enough for sorting out by the Supreme Court.  To begin with, Mr. Snyder 
was not making a defamation claim.  So it is not clear why the disposi-
tive question is whether the church‟s assertions were susceptible of being 
proved true or false.  Nor is it clear why, whether the claim is defamation 
or emotional distress, the plaintiff‟s status as a private figure is irrele-
vant. 
But the court gave short shrift to the complexities of the case law.  It 
did not matter whether the church‟s statements were of public concern 
because they did not assert provable facts.  They employed “hyperbolic 
rhetoric” to spark debate.  The court noted that some signs (those reading 
“You‟re Going to Hell” and “God Hates You”) could be interpreted by a 
reasonable reader as referring specifically to Matthew Snyder.  No mat-
ter, because, as the court concluded, “[w]hether an individual is „Going 
to Hell‟ or whether God approves of someone‟s character could not pos-
sibly be subject to objective verification.”5  With its single-minded focus 
on the factualness of the church‟s claims (again, the wrong focus for an 
emotional distress case), the court looked for contextual evidence that 
would support its conclusion that no reasonable person could think the 
church was asserting provable facts.  Remarkably, it found that evidence 
in the very outrageousness of the church‟s speech: 
 
The general context of the speech in this proceeding is one of impas-
sioned (and highly offensive) protest, with the speech at issue conveyed 
on handheld placards.  A distasteful protest sign regarding hotly de-
bated matters of public concern, such as homosexuality or religion, is 
not the medium through which a reasonable reader would expect a 
speaker to communicate objectively verifiable facts.  In addition, the 
words on these signs were rude, figurative, and incapable of being ob-
jectively proven or disproven.  Given the context and tenor of these two 
signs, a reasonable reader would not interpret them as asserting actual 
facts about either Snyder or his son.
6
 
 
 
 
 5. Id. at 224. 
 6. Id.  Similarly, the court concluded that “the written Epic published on the web-
site of the Church is also protected by the First Amendment, in that a reasonable reader 
would understand it to contain rhetorical hyperbole, and not actual, provable facts about 
Snyder and his son.”  See id. 
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With perverse illogic, the Fourth Circuit has created a legal incen-
tive for religious speakers to be especially abusive and inflammatory: by 
its own calculus, the more “hyperbolic” the speech, the more it is consti-
tutionally protected.  But nothing in the law suggests that the First 
Amendment requires courts to engage in such hermeneutic gymnastics. 
What the Westboro Baptist Church wants is the right to make any 
private individual the target of personal verbal assault about matters of 
private concern—and to do so with complete immunity from the law.  
The Supreme Court has said that speech about public officials or public  
figures, or speech about matters of public concern, may be constitutional-
ly protected, even if it causes emotional distress (though even these 
forms of speech do not get absolute protection).  But the Court has never 
held that the First Amendment protects personal invective “delivered in 
the milieu of religious practice.”7 
This case tests the proposition stated in Cantwell v. Connecticut that 
“[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense commu-
nication of information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution.”8  If 
the speech at question here was directed toward a private person and was 
not a matter of public concern—if, in other words, this case is about 
mere personal invective—there is no reason to grant the church constitu-
tional protection.
9
  If the church‟s speech was targeted toward a most 
 
 7. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 8. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).  See id. at 309 (“One 
may, however, be guilty of [breach of the peace] if he commit acts or make statements 
likely to provoke violence and disturbance of good order, even though no such eventuali-
ty be intended.  Decisions to this effect are many, but examination discloses that, in prac-
tically all, the provocative language which was held to amount to a breach of the peace 
consisted of profane, indecent, or abusive remarks directed to the person of the hearer.”) 
(emphasis added); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (“While the four-letter 
word displayed by Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a per-
sonally provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not „directed to the person of 
the hearer.‟”) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 309). 
 9. The district court concluded that it was Defendants who thrust the Snyder family 
into the unwelcome glare of national media coverage, “transform[ing] a private funeral 
into a public event.”  Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577 (D. Md. 2008).  The 
fact that Matthew‟s funeral attracted public attention does not make him a public figure. 
“A private individual is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becom-
ing involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention.”  Wolston v. 
Reader‟s Digest Ass‟n, 443 U.S. 157, 167 (1979).  Defendants‟ reasoning would in effect 
nullify the Supreme Court‟s precedents that establish the contours of the public figure 
doctrine.  See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323 (1974); cf. St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Smith, 537 A.2d 1196, 
1202-04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (plaintiffs objection to pastor at church meeting does 
not render her a public figure) (citing Gertz and Firestone).  If there is no evidence that 
Matthew or his family assumed a prominent role in public controversy, see Gertz., 418 
U.S. at 351, or that the Snyders sought to use Matthew‟s funeral “as a fulcrum to create 
public discussion,” see Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168, the district court rightly rejected Defen-
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unwilling listener, one who was held captive by special circumstances, 
there is even more reason why the church should be adjudged to have 
forfeited any claim to constitutional immunity from tort suit.
 10
 
Tort liability subjects religious entities to neutral and generally ap-
plicable principles of tort law.  If the church‟s religious advocacy 
amounts to tortious conduct, it would be subject to suit, as would any 
other religious, or non-religious, group.  But tort liability places no spe-
cial burden on religious entities.  Nor does the resolution of tort disputes 
necessarily involve any intermeddling in internal church affairs.
11
  If any-
thing, the Fourth Circuit treads on dangerous ground when it concludes 
that the church does not literally mean what it says.  Because it focused 
on the factualness, and not the hurtfulness, of the church‟s statements, 
the court dismissed those statements as figurative and irreverent.  That is 
an odd judgment.  Certainly, the Westboro Baptist Church does not think 
its speech was mere rhetorical overkill.  Irreverent?  As distasteful as the 
church‟s language might be to others, its message is the heart—and, I 
suppose, the soul—of the church.  This is a church that finds reverence in 
outrageousness. 
Personally abusive speech directed toward a private target held hos-
tage by special circumstances—this is not the type of speech that has me-
rited immunity from tort liability.  To find that such speech is constitu-
tionally protected would not foster the robust debate sought by the 
Fourth Circuit.  Rather, by protecting the personal vilification of private 
individuals, such immunity would work against a civic order where all 
 
dants‟ attempt to “bootstrap their position by arguing that Matthew Snyder was a public 
figure,” Snyder, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 577. 
 10. When speech is forced upon “an audience incapable of declining to receive it,” 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring), 
the Court has not hesitated to uphold the regulation of expressive activity.  See Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Madsen v. Women‟s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); 
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Rowan v. United States Post 
Office Dep‟t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Packer Corp. 
v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (persons 
confronted with defendant‟s jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” could have 
avoided “further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”); Col-
lin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1207 (7th Cir. 1978) (residents could “simply avoid” Nazi-
affiliated party protest activities).  If there are places outside the home where we need not 
be held hostage to verbal confrontation, the setting where we mourn the dead certainly 
must be one of them. 
 11. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Eliza-
beth Blue Hull Mem‟l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Ni-
cholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Gonzalez v. 
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929). 
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people are equally free to express their deepest beliefs.  That freedom, 
like all freedoms, has it limits.  In granting certiorari in Snyder v. Phelps, 
the Supreme Court may help us better understand the limits of religious 
advocacy. 
